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Introduction
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the
manager rather of other people's money than their own, it cannot well
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartner frequently watch
over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honor, and
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the
management of the affairs of such a company.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

The literature on corporate takeovers has focused primarily on
shortcomings of the managements of target companies-who supposedly care more for their own interests than those of the
shareholders-as the motivation for corporate acquisition; the
accompanying run-up in the price of the target's stock is viewed as
confirming evidence of the benefits to shareholders that will arise
from efficiencies introduced by new management. 1 We believe that
this analysis is incomplete and that misleading conclusions may be
drawn from it.
The prevailing literature downplays the fact that the same potentials for conflicts of interest between target shareholders and their
managements exist between acquiring firm shareholders and their
managements. To the extent that manager remuneration, prestige,
and general perquisites are a positive function of firm size, takeovers
represent means by which management may act on this conflict of
interest. Hence, management self-interest in the acquiring firms is an
alternative motivation for corporate acquisition. Contrary to prevailing theory, the market for corporate control may not provide effective policing of manager abuses, especially in the short run. The
empirical evidence on this point is quite clear, as we will see.
In our view, the issue of the justifiability of merger activity is misplaced. Negative wealth effects to acquiring firm shareholders can
Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished Professor and director of the
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at the Center.
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occur even in a properly functioning market for corporate control.
Winners and losers exist and the data are specific as to who they are.
This highlights the fact that simply advocating a free market for corporate control is not sufficient to protect the interests of shareholders. What is required is a stronger set of internal checks on the
agency relationship governing the responsibility of management. In
particular, corporate boards that are more responsive to the concerns
of the shareholders are needed to serve as healthy counterweights to
the actions of management.

The Returns to Acquiring Firms

Implicit in most academic studies of changes in corporate control
is the notion that internal monitoring of management is ineffective in
protecting the interests of the shareholders. Because of the difficulties involved in day-to-day oversight, firms have the incentive to
devote part of their resources to enhance management prerogatives
rather than profit maximization. Hence, they will not be operating
efficiently. This situation will be reflected in a low evaluation of the
company's stock in the market for securities.
Under such circumstances, it has been suggested that the market
for corporate control can act as an external check on management. 2
Undervalued shares invite takeover attempts as outsiders realize the
gains to be made by expelling inefficient, entrenched management.
Replacing those managers with executives more willing to seek a
profit-maximizing strategy will presumably improve the valuation of
the firm's shares in the market. In this view, corporate takeovers provide economic gains. In efficient capital markets, the resultant
increased profitability implies enhanced shareholder wealth. Indeed,
a large number of "event" studies confirm the usual pattern of
increases in stock market evaluations of firms that are targeted for
takeover. 3
Typically, the shareholder gains from an acquisition are estimated
by comparing the "abnormal" returns to the shareholder arising
from the acquisition and the normal returns from ownership of the
stock. A fairly standard and sophisticated methodology has been
developed for this purpose (based on the well-known capital asset
pricing model). We do not quarrel with that approach for the purposes of this study. In fact, we rely upon it in the section that follows.
However, we do need to acknowledge the presence of a few studies
that report contrary results; that is, they show that frequently companies and their stock values perform more poorly after takeovers. 4

As noted earlier, the empirical studies of corporate takeovers focus
on the benefits to the shareholders of the target companies. Nevertheless, a substantial body of data exists on the effects of takeovers
on the shareholders of the acquiring firms. In fact, both sets of data
typically are taken from the same studies, using the same methodology. However, the data on the acquiring firms provide some interesting variation from the dominant theme in the literature which finds
takeovers generally improving the performance of the business sector.
Table 1 presents a survey of ten takeover studies which report
cumulative average abnormal returns to acquiring firm shareholders
over three separate event periods. Virtually all studies report positive
abnormal returns to acquiring firms in the weeks or months prior to
the actual announcement of the merger. This is the factual basis from
which the prevailing literature concludes that shareholders of the
acquiring firm benefit from mergers.
But that is not the end of the story. Only two of the studies show
significantly positive returns around the date of the announcement;
four report insignificant gains or losses during that limited time period, and three report significant decreases in the returns to bidding
companies. Of even greater interest is the fact that nine of the ten
studies go on to report losses in shareholder returns during the period
following the announcement of the merger.
Using the same theoretical framework as the prevailing literature
employs for analyzing the effects on target firms, we are led to the
conclusion that the significant negative cumulative abnormal returns
due to acquisition indicate that the acquisitions are, on average, a
poor investment for acquiring firms. Parallel to the concern about
the shortcomings of target managements, the negative returns indicate the ability of managements of the acquiring firms to act in their
own behalf and not in the shareholders' best interests. 5
Of course, these results have puzzled those sympathetic to the view
that takeovers create wealth. Inevitably, the statistical methodology
has been challenged. Specifically, the notion of measuring cumulative abnormal returns around the event date has been criticized
because returns will be influenced by the size of the firm involved in
the acquisition. Since most acquisitions involve a larger firm acquiring a smaller one, the measured returns to the bidding firm will be
biased downward simply due to the size factor. This concern can be

2

3

Background

Table 1. Average Abnormal Returns to Acquiring Firms
[Periods are reported relative to announcement date (0)]
Cumulative Average
Abnormal Returns
(in percent)

Study
Asquith (1983)

Asquith et. al.
(1983)
Dodd (1980) 1

Dodd and
Ruback (1977)
Eger (1983)

Firth ( 1980)2

Langetieg
(1978) 3
Malatesta
(1983)

Mandelker
(1974)
Mueller and
Magenheim
(1984)

Preannouncement period (- 480 to - 20 days)
Announcement date (0 days)
Post-announcement period (1 to 240 days)
Preannouncement period (- 20 to 0 days)
Announcement date (0 days)
Post-announcement period (1 to 20 days)
Preannouncement period (- 40 to 0 days)
Announcment date (0 days)
Post-announcement period (0 to 40 days)
Preannouncement period ( -12 to -1 months)
Announcement date (- 1 to 1 month)
Post-announcement period (1 to 12 months)
Preannouncement period
Announcement date (- 5 to 10 days)
Post-announcement period (0 to 20 days)
Preannouncement period (- 12 to -2 months)
( -1 month)
Announcement date (0 months)
Post-announcement period (1 to 12 months)
Preannouncement period (- 6 to -1 months)
Announcement date (0 months)
Post-announcement period (1 to 12 months)
Preannouncement period (- 60 to 0 months)
Announcement date (0 months)
Post-announcement period (1 to 6 months)
(7 to 12 months)
Preannouncement period (- 40 to 1 months)
Announcement date (- 1 to 0 months)
Post-announcement period (0 to 40 months)
Preannouncement period
Announcement date (0 months)
Post-announcement period (- 3 to 36 months)

14.3117o*
0.2
-7.2*
2.8*
.;:. 0.9*
-0.2
5.37*
-0.62*
-0.2
11.66*
2.83*
-1.32
n.a.
-4.0*
-3.1 *
-0.3
-0.1
-6.3*
0.5
-2.25*
n.a.
- 6.25*
4.3*
0.9*
-5.4*
-2.2*
4.9*
0.18
-1.5
n.a.
0.28
-42.2*

1
Dodd also reports returns around first public announcement of subsequently completed mergers. The are -1.09%, - .29%, and -7.22% for the preannouncement,
announcement, and post-announcement dates respectively.

Covers U.K. firms.

2

Presents results from four different performance measures. Results reported here
reflect an average of all four measures.

3

*Indicates statistically significant results.

Source: See Bibliography
4

remedied by estimated abnormal dollar returns rather than abnormal
returns per share. Table 2 presents the studies that have been prepared on this aggregate basis.
The results are not very different. Only one study shows evidence
of positive dollar gains to shareholders of acquiring firms, while the
other four have negative returns. Several writers have attempted to
explain away the negative findings. Some suggest that the tendency
for the lack of positive changes in acquiring firm stock value is
related to the fact that the market capitalizes the gains to acquiring
firms at the time they announce a takeover program. 6 Hence individual acquisition announcements have little stock market effect
because they have already been discounted. Other explanations, such
as inefficiencies in the market itself, are quickly dismissed. 7 As for
the statistical methods used, whatever shortcomings they possess are
nevertheless enthusiastically embraced when they show gains to target shareholders.

Net Wealth Effects of Corporate Acquisitions
Evidence of negative returns to acquiring firm shareholders raises
the question of the direction of aggregate wealth effects in the
takeover process. From a policy perspective, the combined gain or
loss to shareholders of target and acquiring firms is the relevant
number on which to focus. The net return identifies if takeovers, on
average, create or reduce social (aggregate) wealth while abstracting
from distributional effects of the process.
A difficulty that arises in the determination of the overall wealth
effects of corporate acquisitions (i.e., returns to acquiring firm
shareholders plus returns to target firms) is that most studies use
average abnormal "rates of return" of the respective firms in question. Comparing returns to acquiring firms and target firms is meaningless since such a comparison says nothing about the aggregated
wealth effects of the merger. For example, a target firm may incur a
positive abnormal return of 200Jo and the acquiring firm only a 50Jo
negative abnormal return. Yet, if the acquiring firm is sufficiently
large (i.e., has a much larger amount of outstanding shares), the
total dollar return of the transaction may be negative.
It is interesting to note that while this aggregate dollar return is the
key number with which policy makers are concerned, very few studies report it and instead concentrate on the "rate of return"
5

Table 2. Average Abnormal Dollar Returns to Acquiring Firms
In Millions

Study
Bradley Desai and Kim (1982) 1
(162 tender offers)

Period (- 20 to 5 days)

1

Period (- 20 to 5 days)

Bradley Desai and Kim (1983)
(698 tender offers)
Firth (1980)
(434 takeovers)

Period ( -1 to 0 months)

Malatesta (1983)
(256 mergers)

Period (- 60 to 0 months)

Varaiya (1985)

Table 3. Average Aggregate Abnormal Dollar Returns
(Acquiring Firm Plus Target Firm Dollar Returns)

1

-$17
+$6
-$1,140
-$111

Study
Bradley Desai and Kim (1982) 1

Period (- 20 to 5 days)

-$17.0

1

Period (- 20 to 5 days)

+ $33.9

Firth ( 1980)

Period (- 1 to 0 months)

- $36.6*

Halpern (1973)

Period ( -7 to 0 months)

+ $27.35*

Malatesta (1983)

Period (- 60 to 0 months)

+$0.29

Period (- 60 to 60 days)

+ $60.7

Bradley Desai and Kim (1983)

Varaiya (1985)
Period (- 60 to 60 days)

In Millions

1

-$129
See Richard Roll, "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers:' Jour-

1

See Richard Roll, "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers:' Jour-

nal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 2 (April 1986): 203.

nal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 2 (April 1986): 203.

*Indicates statistical significance.

Source: See Bibliography.

Source: See Bibliography.

1

approach. We have found only six studies that report total wealth
effects of corporate takeovers. These are reported in Table 3.
The results are mixed. One study (Firth, 1980) presents evidence of
aggregate wealth losses. 8 Another (Halpern, 1973) suggests aggregate
wealth gains, while the remainder do not differ statistically from
zero. 9 From this limited evidence, it appears that the total wealth
effects to society are approximately zero. Clearly, the data do not
support the notion that owners of acquiring firms generally benefit
from takeovers. The available evidence of aggregate returns further
suggests that acquiring firm losses on average are large enough to
completely offset the gains made by owners of target firms.
The next section introduces an alternative view of corporate acquisitions. We suggest that, in a market for corporate control where
transactions costs are present, the managements of the acquiring
firms can pursue acquisition strategies that satisfy their individual
interests at the expense of their shareholders.

6

Management Self-Interest
as an Incentive for Acquisition
The existence of negative returns to shareholders of acquiring
firms suggests that acquisitions do not reflect a profit maximization
strategy on the part of the managements of the acquiring firms. If
shareholder interest (i.e. profit maximization) is not the motivating
factor for takeovers, then it must be the case that management selfinterest is. The same incentive differentials which encourage managers to appropriate the firm's resources for their own benefit can
also be the driving force behind corporate acquisitions.
Through takeovers, acquiring firm managers can create new
potentials for exploiting the manager-shareholder relationship. By
creating larger, more diverse corporations, managers increase the
shareholders' cost and complexity of monitoring. Furthermore, if
the managers' proportion of equity in the new, larger firm falls, that
lowers the cost to management of deviating from a profit-maximizing
strategy. The result of acquisition is that management can extract
more of the firm's resources for itself.
The ability of managers to pursue their own self-interest results
from the nature of the corporate structure (that is a variation of the
7

The "rents" received by management can be broadly classified
into two groups. The first has been called nonpecuniary benefits.
These are the somewhat intangible and difficult to measure benefits
derived from controlling a larger group of corporate assets. Examples of these were mentioned earlier: increased economic or political

power and prestige, greater job satisfaction, etc.
The second type of rent is the pecuniary remuneration received as
a result of managing larger amounts of corporate assets. These more
easily measured rents come in the form of salaries, bonuses,
restricted stock plans, and stock option plans.
Trying to measure nonpecuniary rents is problematic since no real
standard of measurement exists. Consequently, casual observation
presents the only alternative. Certainly, the common perception is
that larger and better perquisites are available to those who control a
greater amount of corporate assets. If one is willing to accept this
presumption as true-and substantial anecdotal evidence is
available-corporate acquisition is an effective method of increasing
the quantity of corporate assets over which management has discretion.
One particular form of nonpecuniary rent studied in the literature
views corporate acquisition as a method of diversifying managers'
"employment risk" (i.e., the risk of losing their jobs, professional
reputations, and employment perquisites). 12 Since manager remuneration and other perquisites are tied to firm activity, the manager's
employment risk is closely related to the firm's risk. While shareholders can diversify their portion of firm risk by holding a broad
portfolio of capital assets, managers heavily endowed in firmspecific (i.e., non-tradeable) human capital are not able to do so. If
managers are risk averse, they will attempt to diversify by some other
means. One such method is to undertake corporate acquisition to
broaden the firm's market and stabilize its income stream. Mergers
having these characteristics may be viewed as a particular form of
management perquisite intended to decrease the risk associated with
the manager's human capital.
This hypothesis suggests that firms more heavily controlled by
managers are more likely to be involved in acquisitions as managers
seek to impose their risk-reducing preferences on the corporate structure. The data appear to bear this point out. A study of acquisitions
between 1961 and 1970 found that, on average, firms with weak
owner control made twice as many acquisitions as those with strong
owner control. 13
Measuring monetary compensation is considerably easier. A variety of scholars has suggested that managerial compensation is
directly proportional to firm size. 14 Maximizing the growth of the
firm becomes the dominant strategy of the self-interested manager.
The data contained in a recent study by the Conference Board support this suggestion. Using the Board's data, Figure 1 shows the rela-

8

9

point made by Adam Smith in the opening quotation). Managers
have two key roles within the firm. First, they have been hired (with
compensation) by the shareholders to apply their particular skills
toward managing the firm's assets. Secondly, managers are often
shareholders and like other owners are concerned with the value of
their shares. Managers who own only small fractions of the outstanding equity and reduce that fraction further through acquisition
can appropriate more of the corporate resources in the form of
"rents" without paying the full cost of doing so.
One team of researchers has confirmed this hypothesis with regard
to acquisitions. A study of 191 acquiring companies during the period 1963-1981 found a positive relationship between abnormal stock
returns from mergers and the percentage of the acquiring firm's
shares held by management. 10 This positive relationship supports the
hypothesis that the lower the percentage of share ownership by the
manager, the greater the incentive to undertake acquisitions that may
not be in the shareholders' best interest.
The market for corporate control can correct this inefficient use of
resources through counter-acquisition. Assuming no market imperfections, another firm (or individual) can acquire the managementdominated firm, pursue the appropriate profit-maximizing strategy,
and reap the benefits of increased value. The gain in doing this must
be distributed between management and the shareholders of both the
acquiring and target firms.
Alternatively, if imperfections such as significant transaction costs
of acquisitions are present, the cost of counter-acquisition may outweigh its payoffs, and the market provides no effective incentive to
correct the situation. One researcher showed that transaction costs
limited tender offers until share values fell at least 13 percent. 11 This
finding supports the possibility of negative returns to acquiring firm
shareholders. While the potential for pursuit of management selfinterest exists, the next section considers the actuality of it occurring.

The Incentives to Acquire
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tionship between total compensation of Chief Executive Officers and
total sales as a proxy for company size. 15 The chart clearly indicates
that managerial remuneration rises with firm size. While other factors contribute to a CEO's salary and bonuses, the Conference Board
reports that approximately half of the variation in CEO pay is statistically explained by variations in company size.
The Conference Board also notes that, among industries providing
sufficient data to analyze (namely, manufacturing, banks, insurance
companies, and retailers), bonus awards tend to be a larger percentage of salary the larger the size of the company. 16 The results reported
by the Conference Board are hardly an aberration. The fact that
managers generally benefit from increased firm size has been well
documented in earlier academic studies. 17
One scholar has directly examined the hypothesis that corporate
acquisition is an effective means of increasing managerial compensation. A study of 355 successful United Kingdom takeovers found the
average increase in managerial remuneration from acquisition to be
33 percent. The average increase for managers of firms not involved
in acquisitions during the same period was approximately 20 percent.
This indicates that, at least in that large sample of changes in corporate control, acquisitions benefited acquiring firm managers substantially. Meanwhile, the shareholders of these firms were losing over 1
billion pounds sterling. 18
The evidence appears clear. The normal operation of the market
for corporate control allows potential for pursuit of self-interest on
the part of acquiring firm management. Furthermore, the benefits to
managers from increases in firm size do exist. Finally, management is
indeed acting on the incentives provided.
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Shareholders have an alternative method of controlling manager
behavior. Regardless of the limited ability of the market for corporate control to police manager activity, shareholders can always
reject a reduction in wealth by voting as a group to disapprove the
merger.
Several explanations have been put forth as to why shareholders
may approve actions that are detrimental to their interests. 19 The
most compelling is that information and transaction costs required
to reject the action may at times be sufficiently large to rule out
effective opposition.
11

Managers may also have an advantage in a merger situation. Even
though share prices had fallen upon announcement, they may convince shareholders either explicitly or implicitly that they have special
information that the market has not taken into account. To the
extent that shareholders trust management, they will be more likely
to rubber stamp the decision.
This serves to highlight the role of the corporate board of directors. The board has a fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest
of the shareholders they represent. Since transaction costs in the market for corporate control and high information costs to shareholders
limit the extent to which they can monitor management activities, the
board of directors assumes the responsibility of doing so.

Conclusions and Policy Suggestions
We conclude that, based on historical data, negative returns to
shareholders from acquisitions are more prevalent than the prevailing folklore on the subject admits. Clearly, there are winners and
losers in the takeover game. Most studies confirm that, in general,
target firm shareholders are winners. The evidence presented here
indicates that, on average, acquiring firm shareholders are not as
fortunate. At best, these shareholders are no worse off, but often
they lose during acquisitions.
Furthermore, while the acquiring firm shareholders are losing
overall, the individuals they have hired to manage their assets are
benefiting from their loss. Takeover promoters are not the champions
of the small shareholder, as so often claimed. Rather, it is intriguing
to note that they promote the interests of a select group of shareholders to which they have no obligation, at the same time neglecting
those whom they were hired to serve.
Despite this rather gloomy reexamination of the takeover process,
we refrain from suggesting additional government regulation as a
solution to managerial abuses. The history of government regulation
of business in the United States hardly supports the case for expanding the role of the public sector in private sector decision making.
The market for takeovers is too complex to permit a regulatory body
or statute to effectively sort out acquisitions that produce only wealth
gains. Moreover, a free market for corporate control is necessary for
the maintenance of an efficient and dynamic corporate sector. Yet,
such a market is not free from imperfections.
12

The appropriate response to corporate acquisition requires
stronger internal checks on the management of acquiring firms.
There are many ways to accomplish this objective. One involves tying
manager remuneration more closely to share price performance
(e.g., stock option plans and larger managerial share holdings).
Other approaches include increasing the accuracy and clarity of
financial reporting, and generally strengthening shareholders ability
to oversee large investment decisions. More fundamental is the
responsibility for oversight of management which is lodged in the
corporate board of directors. A more assertive board willing to take
a stand against actions not in the best interest of the shareholders
they represent will also ensure stronger internal checks on management.
The increasing frequency of legal challenges to board decisions
makes it more likely that board members, especially independent outside directors, will change their customary approach of supporting the
management's proposals for investments and acquisitions, as well as
other matters. Rather than automatically deferring to management
(which at times may subject them to expensive shareholder suits),
board members in the future may be focusing more attention on the
desires of the owners of the firm, whom they legally represent.
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